Determining the Scope of Doctrine of Textualism in Interpretation of Statutes
INTRODUCTION
The most fundamental rule of interpretation is to rely on the plain meaning of the statute. If it is unclear and vague, the court may resort to various interpretation aids. Aids of interpretation can be classified into two types, one being the internal aid and the other, an external aid. An internal aid refers to the aid that is provided from within the statutes, for instance, short title, long title, schedule, preamble, as well as any other provision of the concerned Act. If the uncertainty persists, the court could seek external aid in interpreting a specific provision. Some of the external aids that can be relied upon are dictionaries, parliamentary debates, provisions of other Acts, foreign judgments etc.
The definition of specific terms in an Indian statute can be found in the context or occasion on which they are put to use, rather than in strict etymological language propriety. Since, it is well recognized that the terms are frequently used in their ordinary sense, dictionaries may be consulted to determine the meaning of terms as used in any statute, even though they are not be considered as authoritative in nature.
While interpreting a statute, reference to a dictionary seems to be of great significance. When an expression or a term used in a legislation could not be comprehended in common parlance, the courts can refer to the dictionary meaning of the term to seek its meaning as used in the common parlance while interpreting the legislation under question. As a result, courts consult dictionaries if the need arises to determine the ordinary meaning of terms. However, courts must exercise caution when referring to dictionaries since the dictionary definition of a word may not always be correct in a given context. Courts are not required to consult any dictionary in order to determine the general meaning of a term which has already been defined in the statute. One of the primary goals of any dictionary is to include an appropriate and comprehensive description for each word found within it. Dictionaries are referred to, not only for meaning of the word, but also to find out the general use of it. However, if the dictionary provides different meaning of the same word, then the concerned word should not be construed as per the dictionary. In such scenario, the concerned term should be interpreted as per the context in which it has been used in the provision and legislative intent behind inserting that word as well as overall scheme of the Act should be taken into consideration.
TEXTUALISM
Textualism is a mode of legal interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear.[i] Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text. They are concerned primarily with the plain, or popular, meaning of the text of the Constitution. Textualists generally are not concerned with the practical consequences of a decision; rather, they are wary of the Court acting to refine or revise constitutional texts.
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The Judges frequently rely on the text in conjunction with other methods of constitutional interpretation.[iii] The Court will often look to the text first before consulting other potential sources of meaning to resolve ambiguities in the text or to answer fundamental questions of constitutional law not addressed in the text.[iv] For example, in Trop v. Dulles, a plurality of the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the government from revoking the citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a punishment.[v] When determining that a punishment that did not involve physical mistreatment violated the Constitution, the Court first looked briefly to the text of the Amendment, noting that the “exact scope” of the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Eighth Amendment had not been “detailed by [the] Court.” The plurality then turned to other modes of interpretation, such as moral reasoning and historical practices, in deciding the case. Opponents of a strict reliance solely on the text in interpreting the Constitution suggest that judges and other interpreters may ascribe different meanings to the Constitution’s text depending on their background—a problem compounded by textual provisions that are broadly worded[vi] or fail to answer fundamental constitutional questions. In addition, opponents argue that judges should consider values not specifically set forth in the text, such as those based on moral reasoning, practical consequences, structural relationships, or other considerations. In other words, establishing textual meaning may not be straightforward, and a more flexible approach that does not bind the Court and policymakers to words written 300 years ago may, in the view of those who argue against textualism, be necessary to ensure preservation of fundamental constitutional rights or guarantees.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of statutes hinges on understanding their language and intent, often employing internal and external aids. Internal aids, like titles or schedules, assist initial comprehension. If ambiguity persists, external aids like dictionaries or precedents are consulted, especially for terms used in their ordinary sense. However, caution is crucial as dictionaries may not always offer contextually correct definitions, requiring courts to prioritize legislative intent and the broader Act’s scheme.
Textualism, a method emphasizing the plain meaning of legal texts, probes the objective meaning at the time of ratification without delving into the drafters’ intent. Courts usually start with the text, addressing ambiguities or constitutional questions, and then complement it with other interpretative approaches. While some critique strict reliance on textualism for possibly yielding diverse interpretations and disregarding broader values or practical implications, others advocate for a more adaptable approach to ensure the preservation of constitutional rights in evolving contexts. The debate surrounding textualism underscores the challenges and nuances in interpreting legal texts while balancing adherence to the original language and accommodating contemporary societal shifts.
Author: Ipsita Sinha, in case of any queries please contact/write back to us at support@ipandlegalfilings.com or IP & Legal Filing
REFERENCES
[i] See SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 23–38.
[ii] Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory Of The Constitution 6–7 (1982). See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 22 (8th ed. 2013).
[iii] Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory Of The Constitution 6–7 (1982). See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 22 (8th ed. 2013).
[iv] CHEMERINSKY, supra note 7, at 16; TRIBE, supra note 12, at 2–4; SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 9 (1984).
[v] 356 U.S. 86, 100–04 (1958).
[vi] McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
